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Abstract 
This study focuses on the Statute-related parliamentary debates of the Catalan and Valencian autonomous 
regions and analyses the conceptions of the political communities defended by the political parties, both of 
Spain and of the autonomous region in question and the relationship between them. The goal is to analyse 
the differences over time and across the ideological spectrum of the identification patterns and the 
preferences with regards to the territorial organisation of the Spanish state and the arguments used to 
legitimise these positions. The investigation shows that the current conflict over the rise of secessionism in 
Catalonia is reflected in many different aspects, which is not surprising, but it also shows indications of 
conflict or at least of highly sensitive areas with conflict potential as early as 1979. Furthermore there are 
significant differences in the ways the political parties act in Valencia and Catalonia, respectively. Despite 
the complex dynamics, the results suggest that the inauguration of the Estado de las Autonomías did not 
decrease the conflict potential around the territorial organisation of Spain. 
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The Role of the State of Autonomous Regions: Nation-builder or nation-
demolisher? 
Political and territorial construction of regional and national identities in Spain since 1978. The 
parliamentary debates on the Statutes of Autonomy, Catalonia and Valencia in comparison. 
Introduction 
That the politico-administrative territorial organization of the Spanish State as well as the sentiments of 
belonging accompanying it as a multi-layered political community1 is under stress at the moment hardly 
comes a surprise to anybody. The surge of secessionism in Catalonia over the last 4-5 years has fomented a 
shared conscience among the Spaniards that is going to be difficult to solve. 
A majority of Catalans thus regards Catalonia to be a nation and a significant percentage of them would 
prefer that nation to become an independent State even though this obviously collides with the current 
constitutional set-up. But this was not the case in 1979 when Catalan politicians elaborated the first 
Autonomy Statute and the inhabitants of Catalonia voted it with an overwhelming majority (92 %). In that 
text the self-conception of the Autonomous Catalan Community was clearly that of “nationality” as stated 
in §1 of the Statute: “Catalonia, as a nationality and in order to accede to self-government, constitutes itself 
as an Autonomous Community.”2 Claims that could not legitimately be made in 1979 are thus much more 
widely accepted today.  
Actually the discontent with the decentralisation into self-governing regions – Autonomías – has been 
spreading to the Spanish population in general over the last seven-eight years after a long period during 
which the “Estado de las Autonomías” met with increasing support from the Spanish population3. In many 
Spaniards the crisis – both the economic crisis and the one sparked by the rise of secessionism in Catalonia 
– has slowly sedimented into a loss of faith in the “Estado de las Autonomías” as an efficient way to 
organize Spain and solve the problems of the country. When before it was perceived to have served to 
decrease tensions (Newton and Donaghy 1997: 143), they now seem to be increasing precisely as a result 
of deficiencies of the Estado de las Autonomías. So from being seen as a solution to the tensions inherent 
to Spanish society it has come to be perceived as a part of the problem. 
                                                          
1
 A political community is here understood as the fact of belonging to and participating in the same political system, but 
which also has a more or less profound affective dimension of identifying with the other members of the community. 
2
 Original: “Cataluña, como nacionalidad y para acceder a su autogobierno,  se constituye en Comunidad Autónoma.” 
“Organic Law 4/1979, of 18 December, of Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia”, in Boletín Oficial del Estado (hereafter 
BOE), No. 306, 22 December 1979, p. 29363. 
3
 The support for the present State model of Autonomous Regions had been increasing slowly but steadily since the 
mid-1980s until 2007 when as many as 57.4 % preferred it over other models (Jiménez and Navarro, 2015, pp. 5-6). 
Socio-demographic evidence together with the development of the secessionist crisis in Catalonia since 
2012 thus seem to suggest that only recent changes have caused the edifice of the Estado de las 
Autonomías to begin to crumble. But was it really that solid or were there built-in weaknesses? Did the 
different parts of the State take developments within the Estado de las Autonomías in each their different 
direction that would eventually begin to weaken it? 
In this paper I want to help shed light on these questions by investigating the discourse of the political 
parties in the Statute-related parliamentary debates of two of the autonomous regions in Spain: Catalonia 
and Valencia. The focus will be on the conceptualizations of the involved political communities which in 
both cases are a pair consisting of Spain and the autonomous region in question and how they are related. 
The goal is to investigate how these changing claims were legitimised by politicians vis-à-vis the population 
to make it adhere to the new preferences and which arguments were used. Even if the dynamics involved 
in shaping these preferences and conceptions are very complex, the hope is that the investigation will shed 
light on where to look for the origins of the present crisis and in particular whether the way the 
decentralization was organized helped diminish and channel interterritorial and political tensions between 
preferences for symmetry and asymmetry, as the general discourse about the transition to democracy and 
decentralization wants us to believe, or whether the growing satisfaction with the Estado de las 
Autonomías over many years was the result of something else. 
Academic rationale and methodology 
The 2006-reform of the Catalan Statute, origin of the secessionist crisis of Catalonia, has already been the 
object of quite a lot of scientific works from a range of disciplines, but they often rely a lot on the press as 
source material which is a secondary source with its own interests and its own ideological agenda. 
Advantages can therefore be obtained investigating the primary sources directly and Ferri (2013) actually 
analyses the conception of the political community in the legislative texts of the 2006 Statute reform of 
Catalonia, but does not use the debates and does not compare with other reform processes or the 
development between original statute and reformed statute. So far the other Statute reforms have not 
been studied in any systematic way despite the fact that the legislative processes surrounding the Statutes 
of Autonomy of the seventeen Spanish regions and their subsequent reforms contain obvious potential for 
comparative analysis across the political geography of the Spanish state as well as for studies of the 
temporal evolution of the dynamics behind the reforms. 
Although many studies on politics and public opinion have investigated preferences regarding the territorial 
organization of the state, as well as patterns of identification of the population, we know little about how 
they changed over time, as well as the arguments were used to justify these changes. One way to 
investigate this changing reality is through longitudinal designs that allow for monitoring the change itself, 
as well as the arguments with which the actors give meaning to and legitimise such changes. This requires 
an instrument that is sufficiently sensitive as to detect change over time but which at the same time is 
sufficiently standardised so that the changes measured are the results of real change and not artifacts 
caused by differences in the ways the data are obtained for each observation. The planned protocol of 
codification of the Statute-related parliamentary debates will achieve this thus facilitating the study of the 
intersection between politics and collective identities. 
The added value of this investigation is first and foremostly to produce a series of systematic, longitudinal 
and comparable empirical data on the processes of statutory reforms to compare the changes of the 
definition of the twin political communities involved, and the arguments that legitimise them. The study 
thus permits comparison along both ideological (political parties), spatial (Catalonia – Valencia) and 
temporal axes.  
The first design decision regards the selection of cases. The inclusion of Catalonia in this study is an obvious 
choice due to the aforementioned reasons and to some degree, Valencia serves as an example of the ‘rest 
of Spain’, but the selection can be justified through a classification of the Spanish region based on opinion 
poll data on the nature of Spanish nationalism of its inhabitants. Crossing the territorial identification of 
citizens (Spain vs. Autonomous Community) with nationalist sentiment (Spanish nationalist vs. regionalist 
peripheral nationalist) results in five groups of regions of which Catalonia and Valencia almost fall in the 
extreme opposites: regions characterized by low territorial identification with Spain and prevalence of 
other nationalist sentiments (Catalonia) and regions where territorial identification with the region and 
Spain coexist and where the Spanish nationalist sentiments predominate over regionalist or peripheral 
nationalist (Valencia)4. But the southern border region to Catalonia is also interesting precisely for its 
complex relationship with Catalan nationalism. As the Valencian language linguistically speaking is a 
dialectical variant of Catalan combined with the fact that certain brands of Catalan nationalism speak 
loosely about ‘Catalan countries’ [països catalans] that at the very least implies some kind of open door to 
the Catalan nation for Catalan-speaking citizens of other regions and countries, Valencian nationalists have 
developed a high sensitivity towards any pan-Catalan pretentions on the part of Catalan nationalists. 
                                                          
4
 The criteria have been developed for the research project NACESPAÑOL for the selection of regions where interviews 
of focus groups were to take place. The theme of the interviews were issues related to Spanish nationalism and 
therefore apply to this investigation as well. For the criteria, see M. Jimenez: "Diseño de la Investigación (Criterios de 
Selección de CCAA y Perfil de Integrantes de los Grupos)", accessible at 
http://www.upo.es/proyectos/export/sites/proyectos/nacionalismo_esp/carpetadescar/xWEB_Estudio.previo.Grupos.d
e.discusixn.pdf (consulted 5 November 2015). Particularly, the graphic representation on page 4 is indicative if the 
grouping of regions. 
The second design decision regards the temporal spread. The original Catalan Statute was passed in 1979 
and has only been reformed once, in 2006. The Valencian Statute dates from 1982 and it has been 
reformed three times: in 1991, in 1994 and in 2006. Since the two reforms of the 1990s were minor 
reforms, these two reforms have been eliminated in this study to make the two cases more comparable. 
Our study thus comprises four legislative processes and since what is of interest here is the political 
discourse more than the details of the legislative process we focus exclusively on the parliamentary debates 
of these four legislative processes. In total the analysis comprises 32 parliamentary debates amounting to 
approximately 1450 pages of transcribed debates. 
Normally the conception of one’s own nation, region etc. is taken for granted in most situations and 
therefore not specified or spoken out. But since each Statute begins with specifying the nature of the 
Autonomous Region as well as its relationship to Spain, the political parties have to define and explicitly 
defend their conceptions of Spain and the region in question vis-à-vis the other parties when they engage 
in the legislative debates. Therefore the parliamentary proceedings surrounding the Statutes and their 
reforms constitute an adequate, possibly the best, primary source for investigating these conceptions and 
how they change over time. Furthermore the debates allow us to access the arguments used to construct 
the political communities as in- and out-groups. 
A third design decision is linked to the unit of observation or analysis. As meaning is conveyed not by single 
words but by phrases and often several phrases participate in transmitting the same idea, it was decided 
that the most appropriate unit of analysis was whole paragraphs. Although the analysis is fundamentally a 
qualitative analysis of content, we use graphics and frequencies as the best way to summarize and 
compare. Furthermore, as the reforms do not contain the same number of debates, and as the debates are 
not equally long, we have included a corrective index based on the number of documents and pages per 
document for each of the reforms in all the graphs and interpretations we make of frequencies5. 
The protocol applied to the debates generated in the 4 legislative processes under analysis was developed 
in order to translate the general and specific objectives of the research into research questions and 
concepts. The adjustment between theoretical concepts and their empirical manifestation to make sure 
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 Two factors add important information on the reform processes and the use of arguments and characterizations: the 
number of parliamentary debates that a particular reform has required and the extension of the debates, in this case 
the number of pages of transcribed debate. We have chosen to construct a corrective index applied to each reform: 
total number of pages of debate of reform X / number of parliamentary debates of the reform X. The aim is to obtain a 
more balanced and comparable picture of the density of use of certain argument or a certain characterization between 
the different reforms. 
that instrument was sufficiently sensitive was done through an iterative process between induction and 
deduction.  
The protocol is divided into two parts. The first contains the formal codes that help describe the sample 
with respect to territorial, ideological and temporal origin of the discourse. These three dimensions are at 
the same time the three explanatory factors that are managed to understand the change. The second part 
contains the substantive codes, whose meaning is to measure precisely the change, the dependent variable 
of this study: both in terms of the definition of political communities (in its dual political-administrative and 
identity dimension) as well as in terms of the legitimizing arguments. 
 
  
The Catalan “problem”  
Catalonia and the concession of some kind of regional autonomy to the region6 as a reparation of the 
historical injustice inflicted on the Catalans by the Francoist repression constituted a particular problem 
during the transition of which the entire Spanish political elite was aware. The Catalans on their side 
showed able to mobilize the largest crowds in all of Spain in favour of their demands during the transition, 
but generally speaking it was not a subversive mobilization. More than anything it was meant to support 
and push the developments towards democracy as quickly as possible and to remind the political elites of 
the specificities of the Catalan case rather than on specific contents of the autonomy deal to be 
established. A functioning democracy was thus believed by practically everybody to be dependent upon 
satisfying Catalan wishes for self-government to a significant extent, but this had to be balanced against the 
widespread fears among right-wing and military circles that allowing the Catalans (and the Basques) 
extensive autonomy would lead to the break-up of Spain. 
With respect to the timing it was a problem that democracy works relatively slowly. The Catalan society 
and political establishment could not wait for a proper democracy to be installed after drafting up and 
debating first a Constitution and then an autonomy statute. It was clear to most politicians that significant 
concessions had to be granted more quickly. Prime Minister Suárez thus in a rather audacious move 
immediately after the first democratic elections began negotiating with the head of the Catalan regional 
government in exile7, Josep Tarradellas, and as a result invited him to return to Spain in October 1977. By 
means of a number of decrees a preliminary pre-autonomous regime under Tarradella’s leadership was 
established while waiting for the definitive regional autonomy to be installed after approval of the 
Constitution and an autonomy statute. This happened as the Constitution was only beginning to be drafted. 
Despite the fact that the original plan only foresaw pre-autonomy regimes for Catalonia and the Basque 
Country and perhaps Galicia, it very quickly became a demand by many other regions. The rush began 
already in late 1977 and the process to some extent got out of hand from very early on. This pressure, 
however, provided the executive with a solution to the balancing problem mentioned above by extending 
autonomy to virtually all would-be regions long before the Constitution was passed. The ‘pre-autonomous’ 
                                                          
6
 A lot of what is said about Catalonia in this article is also true for the Basque Country. During the transition to 
democracy the two regions together constituted a complex problem with implications for the territorial organization of 
the Spanish State, but as this chapter deals with a comparison between Catalonia and Valencia, I shall only refer to the 
Catalan part of the problem. 
7
 Since the civil war, Catalan elites had maintained a representation of the former Catalan regional government in the 
exile, which in 1954 had recognized Tarradellas as the representative head of the government in exile.  
regimes were thus extended to many more regions in 1978 than originally foreseen by decision of the 
Minister of Territorial Administration, Manuel Clavero8. 
This generalization of the autonomy process was of course a symmetrical measure that served as a way to 
limit the special status of particularly Catalonia and the Basque Country. Initially, they were the only 
recognized 'historical nationalities', which as such were allowed to accede to autonomy via the so-called 
'quick lane' of the Constitution’s §1519. This meant that not only did they develop the autonomy statutes 
much more swiftly and at a very early stage of this whole process, they also did so through a different 
procedure where the direct role of the national Parliament in Madrid was reduced to simple ratification of 
a statute previously accorded at regional level.  
From the Kingdom of Valencia to the Autonomous Community of Valencia 
The Valencian region was destined to develop its autonomy in the shadow of the Catalan process, although 
the region had almost as many arguments in favour of being considered a historical nationality like 
Catalonia and the Basque Country, except for one, important thing: The fact that the region did not succeed 
in establishing regional autonomy during the Second Republic. The Valencians also mobilized in favour of 
democracy and autonomy with huge demonstrations as early as October 1977 and the mayors of the 
practical totality of municipalities of the region signed a manifesto in order to achieve full autonomy 
through the ‘quick’ lane as a historical nationality. In the end, however, the Levantine region was not 
allowed to accede to autonomy via §151. A change of tactics, particularly within the governing Union of the 
Democratic Centre (hereafter UCD), to restrict access to the ‘rapid’ lane in order to control the right-wing 
and military discontents forced the UCD’s political allies and institutions in the region to drop the claim for 
a §151 autonomy and accept the so-called ‘general regime’ of §143. In November 1980 the regional leaders 
of the UCD – Enrique Monsonis – and of the Socialist Party (hereafter PSOE) – Joan Lerma – came to an 
accord on applying for autonomy through the ‘slow lane’ or general regime.  From then on the central 
question became how to secure a level of autonomy equal to that of the ‘historic nationalities’ without 
being recognised as one. In the debates on the Autonomy Statute of Valencia in 1982, there was some 
background resentment for being ousted from the group of ‘nationalities’. But as the draft statute arrived 
                                                          
8
 By September 1978 the ‘pre-autonomous’ regime had been extended to Galicia, Aragon, Valencia, Canary Islands, 
Andalusia, Extremadura, Castile and León and Castile-La Mancha (Gibbons 1999: 17). 
9
 The Constitution established two ‘routes’ of access to autonomy: the ‘rapid lane’ or special access of §151 and the 
‘slow lane’ or general regime of §143. The former was designed to accommodate the “historical nationalities”, 
Catalonia and the Basque Country, and gave immediate access to autonomy. The main exception was Andalucía that 
rebelled against government directions because it was one of the few regions where the UCD didn't control the regional 
Assembly. Through the celebration of a regional referendum on a draft statute on 28 February 1981, the region forced 
the Government to accept its status as a “historical nationality.” 
in Madrid with the basic consensus of the large parties (the UCD and the PSOE) it remained mostly a distant 
‘rumble’. Particularly issues related to the official name of the region, the Valencian language and the 
symbols of the region. In short these conflicts were about balancing the historical and linguistic claims to a 
proper identity that the politicians of the Valencian region nourished against the political necessities 
(accepted by a majority but not by all) of being granted access to autonomy only via the so-called ‘general 
regime’ of §143.  
At the same time a huge sensitivity towards anything which could be considered pan-Catalanist pretensions 
towards the Valencian region and its status was evident in the debates. It was felt particularly strongly in 
the debates surrounding the language issue but also in other questions such as the name of the region and 
the dispute about the official flag. The struggle for the Valencian politicians to find a proper identity – 
distinct from any Catalan identity – and a proper place for their region in the concert of Autonomous 
Regions in Spain proved rather difficult, but also hugely important to all involved. 
This development towards the Valencian Autonomy Statute, which at first had been characterised by 
illusion ended in a disappointment and social disenchantment. Largely against their will, the elites of the 
dominant Valencian political parties were turned into subalterns of their respective national party 
leaderships. The result – the final Statute – did not really arouse passion in any of the participating parties; 
the concessions they had all agreed to in order to arrive at the final result were simply too important. It was 
called “the possible Statute” by various members, like here by the regional leader of the Socialist party, 
Lerma: “we have done exactly what History demanded of us, to say yes to this Statute, because it was the 
possible Statute.”10 It was basically seen as a starting point for an autonomy settlement that, once 
implemented, would have to develop further in order to deepen the autonomy11. Satisfaction was 
postponed and thus subject to future developments12. 
  
                                                          
10
 Original: “nosotros hemos hecho exactamente lo que la  Historia nos demandaba, decir que sí a este Estatuto, porque 
era el Estatuto posible.” Intervention by Lerma (PSOE), in Diario de Sesiones del Congreso de los Diputados (hereafter 
DdSC) 28 April 1982, p. 13707. 
11
 To achieve a level of competencies comparable to that of the historic nationalities the Statute was complemented 
through a Transitional Disposition and a contemporary Organic Law on transfer of competence, although both 
measures precisely were conceived of as temporary. 
12
 For accounts of the peculiar Valencian road towards the Autonomy Statute, see Mainar (2010) and Ruiz (2003). 
Intertwined conceptions of the political communities in comparison 
In the following I will analyse the conceptions of the twin political communities involved in Autonomy 
Statutes: the ‘superior’ political community and the ‘inferior’, or ‘big’ and ‘small’ as is implied in the Spanish 
saying: “la Patria grande y la Patria chica”. The interest is focused on how the political communities 
involved are characterised and related in the discourse and how these definitions change over time across 
the ideological spectrum. As stated above there is always a correspondence between the definitions of the 
larger and the smaller political communities; the logic by which their conception is linked might not be the 
same, but the two communities will always be conceived of together in some kind of relationship, the 
analysis of which is very interesting for what it says about the underlying conceptualisations of Spain and its 
parts and the conflicts with other conceptions.  
Valencia  
Between the debates on the original Valencian statute in 1982 and the reform in 2006 we see a clear shift 
in how the community is described especially among the right-wing and the peripheral nationalists. In 1982 
Valencia was described as both a “region” and a “nationality” in an approximately equal number of cases 
(44% and 56% of the total, respectively), but it was only defined as a “region” by the right-wing parties, the 
UCD and the Popular Alliance (hereafter AP), whereas the rest of the political parties preferred to define 
the community as a “nationality”. At the time the characterisation of the Valencian region as a “nation” was 
entirely absent. 
But in 2006 the characterisation preferred by the vast majority was “nationality” and “region” shifted to a 
third place behind “nation” (76%, 10%, and 14% of the total, respectively). Instead of only as a “region”, the 
right-wing began referring preferentially to Valencia as a “nationality”, and likewise the left-wing, especially 
the United Left (hereafter IU), preferred “nationality”. 
If we look at the arguments used by the different political parties to defend the conceptions, the right-wing 
did not dramatically change its palette of arguments. The most important arguments used in conjunction 
both with defining Valencia as a “region” in 1982 and as a “nationality” in 2006 were concerned with 
justice, the Constitution and democracy, on the one hand, and the history, culture and tradition of the 
Valencian region, on the other. But there are nuances, nevertheless, which are revealing for the context 
and the general conceptualisation of the Spanish state: in 1982 quite a lot of reference is made to the 
conflictual process of coming into being of the Statute referred to above. The preference for a conception 
as a region is defended among other through opposition to the nationalist attitude of other political 
parties, as when Fernando Abril, Vice-President of the UCD-Government, argued in favour of a “healthy 
regionalism” of Valencia as opposed to nationalism:  
“We do not want nationalist contradictions to get involved in this, and our position, in the end, 
only consists in recuperating some signs of identity that testify to the fact that our Autonomous 
Community is going to be constituted in the form of a healthy regionalism that coexists 
pacifically, harmoniously and enthusiastically with the rest of Spain.”13 
The predominant description of Valencia as a “region” was combined with the then dominant 
conceptualisation of Spain as a “nation” among right-wing parties in 1982 in Valencia as can be seen in 
Figure 1 below. 
Figure 1 Characterisations of Spain by right-wing parties (Valencia) 
  
[Source: own elaboration] 
The Statute’s §1 actually reproduced large parts of the text of §2 of the Constitution defining Valencia as a 
nationality “within the unity of the Spanish Nation”14, which was of course agreed to by all parties as here 
by the UCD: 
“in the text […] appears the concept of ‘nationality,’ and it is contextualised within the meaning 
of the profound unity of the Spanish nation.”15 
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 Original: “No queremos que se mezclen contradicciones nacionalistas, y toda nuestra posición, en definitiva, no 
consiste más que en recuperar unas señas de identidad que acreditan que nuestra Comunidad Autónoma se va a 
constituir en forma de un sano regionalismo que convive pacífica, armónica y entusiásticamente con el resto de 
España.” Intervention by Abril (UCD), in DdSC 29 December 1981, p. 2735. 
14
 “Ley Orgánica 5/1982, de 1 de julio, de Estatuto de Autonomía de la Comunidad Valenciana”, in BOE, No. 164, 10  July 
1982, p. 17235.  
15
 Original: “en la redacción (…) aparece el concepto “nacionalidad”, y aparece contextualizado en el sentido de la 
unidad profunda de la nación española (…).” Intervention by Abril (UCD), in DdSC 28 April 1982, p. 13682. 
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As a pair, the two political communities Spain and Valencia were thus conceptualised together as “nation” 
and “region”, respectively, in a rather classical way. This points to the fact that the right-wing was behind 
the agreement to prohibit Valencia access to autonomy via the ‘rapid’ §151 and that it was internalised by 
their politicians. 
By 2006 the focus of the right-wing had changed from defending regionalism as a way of securing a 
harmonious relationship between the political communities in Spain to defending symmetrizing  
amendments to the autonomy system. This meant that the definition of Valencia as a “region” was almost 
dropped in favour of a conception of Valencia as a “nationality” to level it with the Autonomous 
Communities with the highest level of self-government, notably Catalonia and the Basque Country. 
Therefore the argument of compensating injustices was used for the first time by right-wing politicians, not 
to defend preferential treatment due to injustices suffered during Francoism, but to repair the unjust 
favouritism of particularly the two aforementioned regions. As when the conservative representative of the 
Valencian regional parliament, Serafín Castellano, defended the reform in Madrid: 
“this is what inspires our reform: that there are no first class and second class communities, nor 
unjust privileges of certain communities over others. One thing is plurality or the differentiating 
traits and quite another political discrimination.”16 
In fact in the 2006-reform, it was the Popular Party (hereafter PP) which used this argument more than any 
other political party after not having used it at all during the first 24 years of the Statute. In 2006, the 
conservative party totaled 39 % of the use of that particular argument. By contrast, in the debates on the 
original Statute it was above all the left-wing parties that used it, the PSOE and the Spanish Communist 
Party totalling 60 % of its use17. The left-wing parties thereby showed their dissatisfaction with the fact that 
Valencia was not allowed to accede to autonomy as a “historical nationality” as Catalonia and the Basque 
Country. 
In contrast to the right-wing, the left-wing parties did not alter their way of conceiving of the Valencian 
political community between 1982 and 2006: to their politicians Valencia was above all a “nationality” in 
1982 and continued to be so in the debates on the reform in 2006 as can be seen in Figure 2 below. Even if 
the frequency with which the term was employed increased between 1982 and 2006, its predominance 
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 Original: “esto es lo que inspira nuestra reforma: que no existan comunidades de primera y de segunda, ni privilegios 
injustos de unas comunidades sobre otras. Una cosa es la pluralidad o los hechos diferenciales y otra bien distinta la 
discriminación política.” Intervention by Serafín Castellano (PP), in DdSC 20 September 2005, p. 5559. 
17
 In the two reforms of the 1990s it was above all the Valencian nationalist parties that stated the need to compensate 
injustices; the two nationalist parties totalled 63% of the total use in those two reform processes. 
over the two other terms was the same. Both “nation” and “region” remained residual among left-wing 
politicians both in 1982 and in 2006. 
Figure 2 Characterisations of Valencia by left-wing parties (Valencia) 
  
[Source: own elaboration] 
In 1982 there was quite a lot of resentment, particularly among the left-wing, about the fact that the 
Valencian region had not been allowed to apply for autonomy via the ‘rapid’ way. In this context the 
denomination as “nationality” was seen as a reparation of this injustice, as expressed by the Socialist 
senator Bevia: 
“it facilitates, in short, the recovery of the collective personality of our people, which an 
officially sponsored centralist attitude had tried to eliminate.”18 
This corresponds with the arguments that were used by the left-wing parties in the 1982-debates. 
Arguments concerned with justice, the Constitution and democracy were the most common and were used 
by practically every left-wing politician, but in second place came arguments related to the compensation 
of injustices, which were used by approximately two thirds of the left-wing politicians. The injustices 
referred to always related to the mismatch between the historical roots of the Valencian region as an 
independent entity and the fact that it was forced to apply for autonomy through the so-called general 
regime. 
                                                          
18
 Original: “nos facilita,  en suma, la recuperación de la personalidad colectiva de nuestro pueblo, que una fomentada 
actitud sucursalista había tratado de anular.” Intervention by Bevia Pastor (PSOE), Diario de Sesiones del Senado 
(Hereafter DdSS), 14 June 1982, p. 7949.  
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In 2006, the focus shifted away from arguments about compensating injustices and even justice, the 
Constitution and democracy in favour of arguments concerned with history, culture and tradition. These 
argument were precisely related to the full recognition as “historical nationality”, which was implemented 
in the 2006-reform as can be seen in the words of the Socialist politician from the Valencian regional 
Parliament Ciprià Císcar: 
“We are faced with a proposal for comprehensive reform [...] that reflects the will to move 
forward and regain the ground that it was impossible to reach at the beginning of the 1980s, 
when the vast majority of municipalities of Valencia, Alicante and Castelló expressed the desire 
and request for full autonomy.”19 
The reform thus put an end to the special situation of Valencia with an average Statute supplemented by a 
special organic law on transfers of competences by fusioning the latter into the Statute. It thereby acquired 
a character very close to that of the ‘real’ historical nationalities, without changing the fact, of course, that 
Valencia had not been allowed to apply via §151. But in 2006, the recognition of the status as ‘historical 
nationality’ played a large role in the arguments used to argue for and against the agreement behind the 
Statute reform. 
The nationalists and regionalist parties of Catalonia and other regions, on the other hand, in the 2006-
reform began showing a marked preference for explicitly characterising Valencia as a “nation”, where they 
in 1982 generally had eluded defining the Autonomous Community. This change was consistent, however, 
with the increasingly dominant conception among these parties of Spain as a plurinational State.  
Catalonia  
The characterization of Catalonia changed even more dramatically from the debates on its original Statute 
in 1979 when it was predominantly seen as a “nationality” by all political forces in accordance with the 
Constitution, and only by a minority as either a “nation” or a “region” (75%, 18% and 7%, respectively). In 
2006, it was predominantly considered to be a “nation” particularly by the Catalan nationalists as well as by 
the national left-wing parties - the PSOE and the IU - and only secondly to be “nationality” (82% and 16%, 
respectively). The characterisation as “region” had practically disappeared and only accounted for 2%. The 
only party not subscribing to the change at all was the PP, which instead increasingly, with respect to 1979, 
accepted to characterize Catalonia as a “nationality”. This is not surprising given the fact that it was the PP, 
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 Original: “Nos encontramos ante una propuesta de reforma amplia(…) que refleja la voluntad de avanzar y recuperar 
el terreno que no fue posible alcanzar al principio de los años ochenta, después de que la inmensa mayoría de los 
Ayuntamientos de Valencia, Alacant y Castelló se pronunciaran expresando el deseo y la solicitud de una autonomía 
plena.” Intervention by Císcar (PSOE), DdSC, 9 February 2006, p. 7456.  
which afterwards took the new Catalan Statute to the Constitutional Court among other due to the 
definition of Catalonia as a nation. 
The left-wing parties, as stated above, changed their way of conceiving of the Catalan political community 
between 1979 and 2006: from being conceived of as fundamentally a “nationality” in 1979, the 
predominant characterisation in 2006 had become a “nation” as can be seen below in Figure 3: 
Figure 3 Characterisations of Catalonia by left-wing parties (Catalonia) 
 
[Source: own elaboration; parties included: PSOE, PSC, PCE, PSUC, IU, ICV, EUiA] 
Neither in 1979 nor in 2006 was there any significant difference of conception among the different left-
wing parties: They all experienced the same change in the way of conceiving of Catalonia from a 
“nationality” to a “nation”. The same is true for the arguments that the left-wing parties used to legitimise 
their conceptions of the political community: in all cases – in both left-wing and centre-left-wing and in 
both 1979 and 2006 – the most commonly used argument circled around justice and the Constitution and 
the second most common mentioned history, culture and tradition. Only in the third place did a difference 
appear between 1979, when the argument about compensating injustices was used particularly by the 
Socialists, and 2006 when that argument disappeared completely to be substituted by arguments about 
citizens’ demand. 
But if we look at how the left-wing parties characterised the large political community, Spain, a difference 
appears between the centre-left-wing and the left-wing parties. In 1979 the centre-left-wing practically 
only characterised Spain in the vague terms of either “a state” or “Spain”, which reveals nothing about the 
attitude towards the national question, and in the debates on the 2006-reform the relative weight of these 
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imprecise characterisations only increased as can be seen below in Figure 4. But the principal change 
regards the appearance of the by then newly endorsed term of “nation of nations”, which became the 
second-most popular way of characterising Spain among the Socialists. The centre-left-wing conception of 
the pair of political communities thus changed from conceiving of Catalonia as a “nationality” and Spain 
mostly in imprecise terms of “Spain” in 1979 to conceiving of Catalonia as a “nation” and Spain as a “nation 
of nations” to a high degree; that is Catalonia as one the lower level nations of that conceptualization and 
Spain as the superior level nation. 
Figure 4 Characterisations of Spain by Socialist parties (Catalonia) 
 
[Source: own elaboration; parties included: PSOE and PSC] 
In 1979 the left-wing parties to a large extent avoided characterising Spain but when they did, they 
basically conceived of Spain in the same terms as the centre-left-wing as either a “state” or simply as 
“Spain”. But in contrast to the centre-left-wing, in 2006 only relatively few used the Socialist concept of 
“nation of nations” and instead opted predominantly for conceiving Spain as a “state” or a “plurinational 
state”, as can be seen below in Figure 5. These ways of conceiving of Spain thus differed from those of the 
Socialists in so far as they relied on seeing Spain as mainly a “state” and contemporaneously conceiving of 
Catalonia as a “nation”. 
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Figure 5 Characterisations of Spain by Communist parties (Catalonia) 
 
[Source: own elaboration; parties included in 1979: PCE, PSUC and in 2006: EUiA, ICV and IU] 
The right-wing parties, on the other hand, did not change their way of conceiving of the Catalan political 
community between 1979 and 2006: It was conceived of as a “nationality” and a “region” in approximately 
the same proportion in the two legislative processes as can be seen in Figure 6 below. But in 2006 a new, 
negative way of characterising Catalonia appeared as a reaction to the conception of Catalonia as a 
“nation” that was predominant among other parties during the reform process. The negative conception – 
that was almost only found among politicians of the PP – simply stated that Catalonia “is not a nation” 
without specifying what they believed it to be. The arguments linked to legitimising the conceptions of 
Catalonia were not affected though by this new negative way of conceiving of the political community; the 
most commonly used arguments remained the same between 1979 and 2006; most important were 
arguments linked to the Constitution and ideas of justice and democracy and secondly arguments linked to 
history, culture and tradition. 
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Figure 6 Characterisations of Catalonia by right-wing parties (Catalonia) 
 
[Source: own elaboration; parties included in 1979: AP, UCD and in 2006: PP] 
If we check the corresponding conception of Spain of the right-wing, there is a clear correlation with the 
advent of the negative “Not a nation”-conception of Catalonia in 2006. When Spain was characterised 
contemporaneously with the “Not a nation”-view of Catalonia, it was nearly always as a “nation”. These 
characterisations were thus linked directly to the conflict over the conception of Catalonia in the new 
Statute and corresponded to a significant change in the way the right-wing conceived of Spain in the same 
legislative procedures. In 1979 during the debates on the original Statute the term “nation” was practically 
not used by any party, not even the right-wing, as can be seen in Figure 7. 
Figure 7 Characterisations of Spain by right-wing parties (Catalonia) 
  
[Source: own elaboration] 
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But in 2006, it was used massively by the PP (81% of the total mentions correspond to this party) despite 
being only the 5th most popular way of characterising Spain. It became the right-wing’s most common way 
of describing the Spanish political community. This evidences the conflict between the PP and almost all the 
other parties that in 2006 reserved the category of “nation” to Catalonia (see above) preferring other ways 
of characterizing Spain. Despite being presented as fundamentally an unaltered way of conceiving the pair 
of political communities, the conception of them in the right-wing’s discourse actually changed from 
conceiving of Catalonia in 1979 as a “nationality” or “region” and Spain mostly in imprecise terms of 
“Spain” or a “state” to conceiving of Catalonia as a “not a nation” and Spain explicitly as a “nation” in 2006. 
Is El Estado de las Autonomías the “Patria grande” or is it “not a Patria”? 
With regards to how the relationship between the “Patria grande”, Spain, and the “Patria chica”, Catalonia 
or Valencia in our case – is conceived of, the various kinds of relationships permitted by the Constitution 
are all confirmed, but we also observe developments towards conceptions that ‘stretch’ the meaning of the 
Magna Carta or go beyond what is constitutionally admissible. The explicit definition of Spain as a “nation,” 
as the country is in fact defined in §2 of the Constitution, was dominant only among right-wing politicians in 
both regions and not at all times, whereas politicians from other parties usually preferred other ways of 
referring to Spain.  
In this respect it is interesting that in 1979 during the debates on the original Catalan Statute the term 
“nation” was practically not used at all by any party, not even by the right-wing. Even if the most accepted 
way to define Catalonia at the time was as a “nationality”, as it was in fact the intention of the Constitution, 
the corresponding term for Spain – a “nation” – was not used, which both seems to indicate a conflict 
already then and a will to avoid this conflict. For some politicians a lot effort was invested in avoiding the 
term as did for example the Socialist senator Morán López who changed the wording of what was clearly a 
citation of the famous §2 of the Constitution so as to avoid using the term “nation” about Spain: 
“The text develops the difficult relationship between the diversity of the peoples of Spain and 
the indissoluble unity of its legal and political expression, which is the Spanish state”20 
The almost total absence of this definition of Spain is only more striking when compared with its use during 
the reform process of 2006 where the right-wing party, PP, used the definition as a “nation” massively 
about Spain, which is an indication of the absence of any intention to avoid conflict. On the contrary, to use 
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 Original: “El texto desarrolla la difícil relación entre la diversidad de los pueblos de España y la unidad indisoluble de 
su expresión jurídico-política que es el Estado español.” Intervention by senator Morán López (PSOE), DdSS, 12 
December 1979, p. 1425. 
“nation” about Spain in the context of the 2006 Catalan statute negotiations was a clear sign of conflict, 
even it was a constitutionally correct characterisation. 
Another constitutionally correct characterisation of Spain is to define it as a “state”, but it is also one of the 
ways of eluding the difficult question of defining the nation; hence the interest in monitoring the 
development in its use. Its usage increased significantly in both Catalonia and Valencia between 1979/82 
and 2006 and it was used by all parties as can be seen in Figures 8 and 9. From a 2nd and 3rd place, 
respectively, it became the most popular way of defining Spain in 2006 in both regions, which is interesting 
because it seems related to the problems with defining Spain as more than simply a state. 
Figures 8 & 9 Characterisations of Spain as a “State” by region 
       
[Source: own elaboration] 
The differences between the dominant national parties (the PP and the PSOE) and the rest of the political 
parties become clearer when we look at the other imprecise characterisations of Spain such as “nation of 
nations” or simply as “Spain”. The concept of “nation of nations” was inexistent in the transition, but during 
the Zapatero period it became the preferred definition of the “plural Spain” of the Socialists. In the 2006 
reform in Valencia it was thus used exclusively by the PSOE and the Socialists were also the ones who used 
it most in the 2006 reform of Catalonia, but in the latter case all the other parties actually also used the 
term or similarly imprecise definitions of plurality within Spain. 
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The characterisation of Spain simply as “Spain” more or less consistently was the 2nd most popular way of 
characterising Spain and in the case of the debates on the original Statute in Catalonia it held a 1st place. In 
both regions its use by the PP and the PSOE increased significantly from the time of the transition to the 
2006-reforms, by which time the two parties totalled between 72 and 83% of the use of this 
characterisation. By contrast, the rest of the political parties did not increase their use of this way of 
defining Spain, remaining basically at the same level as in 1979/82 as can be observed in Figures 10 and 11: 
Figures 10 & 11 Characterisations of Spain as “Spain” by region 
      
[Source: own elaboration] 
The difference is equally clear, although in the reverse way, with the anti-constitutional characterisation of 
Spain as a “plurinational state”. The term is not imprecise in the same way as the definition of Spain as 
“Spain” or a “state” in that it clearly defines Spain as a state that is made up of various nations, although 
the exact number and names of these always remain in the unclear. Furthermore, this definition also 
clearly expresses that Spain itself is not a nation. This is where the difference between Valencia and 
Catalonia becomes clearest. In Valencia this term was never really used21, but in Catalonia it was used, 
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 It was not even used by the Valencian nationalists – Unió Valenciana and Esquerra Nacionalista de Valencia – who in 
the mid-1990s, when they still existed, defended the idea of Valencia as a nation. In 2006 they had disappeared 
completely in the parliamentary panorama. 
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especially in the 2006 reform. From virtually inexistent in 1979, in 2006 the PP and the PSOE continued to 
avoid using this definition, whereas all the other political parties – both the national left-wing parties, the 
Catalan nationalist parties and other nationalist and regionalist parties – turned to this definition as can be 
seen in Figure 12, where the evolution of PP’s and PSOE’s use of the term is flat as opposed to that of all 
the other parties. 
Figure 12 Use of the term “plurinational State” in 2006 Catalan reform  
 
[Source: own elaboration] 
The use of the characterisation even became so popular that it was the 3rd most common way of 
characterising Spain after “Spain” and “state” as can be seen in this typical example from an MP of the 
Catalan nationalist party, Convergence and Union (hereafter CiU): 
“CiU […] backs a recognition of the plurinational, plurilinguistic and pluricultural reality of the 
Spanish state”22 
This is also one of the places where the  
differences between the centre-left-wing, the Socialists, and the left-wing become clearest: Even if both 
backed the Catalan reform since its very formulation, their definitions of Spain were clearly distinct, the IU 
and other left-wing associate parties clearly favouring a view of Spain as mainly a state and to many even a 
plurinational state and the Socialists generally avoiding to define Spain of favouring imprecise terms. 
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 Original: “Convergència i Unió (…) apuesta por un reconocimiento de la realidad plurinacional, plurilingüística y 
pluricultural del Estado español.” Intervention by deputy Puig (CiU), Diario de Sesiones del Congreso de los Diputados. 
Comisiones (Hereafter DdSCC), 15 March 2006, p. 35. 
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It is also interesting, however, that the Catalan nationalists and the national left-wing parties use 
“plurinational state” about Spain in context of the Catalan 2006-reform but not in the Valencian 
contemporaneous reform. This once again evidences the conflict that arose around the definition of 
Catalonia as a “nation” in the 2006 statute reform, a definition which of course had implications for how 
Spain could be conceived of. The IU, the Catalan nationalists and the other nationalists and regionalists 
consequently chose to conceive of Spain as mainly a “plurinational state”, whereas the Socialists, who also 
defended the conception of Catalonia as a nation – preferred their ‘homegrown’ term of “nation of 
nations”. The PP resisted this tendency altogether and continued to conceive of Catalonia as a “nationality” 
and Spain as a “nation” (in contrast with how they had defined the country in 1979). 
Conclusions 
Unsurprisingly, in this investigation we see the conflict over the Catalan Statute reflected in many ways, 
both in the conceptions of Spain as well as in the conceptions of Catalan political community and in the 
relationship between them. The wish among the Catalan political elite that Catalonia be considered a 
“nation” sparked a conflict that did not go away even if the statute negotiations left only one reference to 
the wish in the preamble of the law and eliminated all the rest. As a reaction the PP insisted on using the 
term “nation” about Spain indicating the conflict between the conservative party and all the other political 
parties. 
But just as interesting, the investigation also shows a hidden conflict already in 1979 in the absence of the 
use of “nation” about Spain, even if that was a constitutionally sanctioned conception. By contrast, in the 
1982 debates on the Valencian Statute, the term “nation” was not avoided even if other more imprecise 
definitions of Spain prevailed. The fact that that the definition of Spain as a “nation” was avoided in 1979 in 
the Catalan context is interesting, particularly as the corresponding definition of Catalonia as a “nationality” 
was widely used. It thus seems that the issue of defining Spain too clearly as nation was a sensitive issue 
even then despite the high level of acceptance of the Autonomy Statute. A general environment guided by 
avoiding hurting sensibilities seems to have been dominant and it was respected by the right-wing parties 
in contrast to 2006 when the PP did not show any interest in avoiding the conflict by not using the term 
“nation” about Spain. This corresponds to the difference between the negotiations in 1979, when the UCD 
was part of the compromise behind the Statute, and in 2006, when the PP was not part of the political 
compromise behind the reform. Nevertheless, in 1979 the AP actually maintained a critical stance towards 
the Statute and abstained in the final vote in both chambers of Parliament23, but even so its politicians 
almost did not use “nation” about Spain at all. 
Similar cautions and/or problems with defining Spain in terms of identification are likely to be behind the 
increased use of terms that avoid defining Spain as nation which were very common already in the 
transition years and have only grown in popularity since then. Far from becoming less complicated since 
the inauguration of the Estado de las Autonomías, the problems with defining Spain in national terms as 
something other than simply a state thus seems to have increased. 
Not only the dominant national parties, however, are cautious; at certain times also even the secessionist 
parties are more cautious than at other times. The fact that the Catalan nationalists and the national left-
wing parties used “plurinational state” about Spain very often in the context of the Catalan 2006-reform 
but not in the Valencian contemporaneous statute reform seems to imply that such strongly anti-
constitutional conceptions are only used explicitly when the circumstances demand it. In the Valencian 
reform there was nothing to trigger such conflict around defining the political communities and the 
relationship between them, which meant that the political parties otherwise favouring conceptualisations 
bordering or trespassing the constitutionally permissible such as the IU or the Catalan and Basque 
nationalists refrained from using a conflictual term as “plurinational State”. 
The dynamics at play here are very complex and this investigation has only focused on a very limited area 
of the total forces involved. Furthermore, the results presented here are but the first results of much more 
comprehensive analysis which we are only undertaking as this is being written. Nevertheless, the 
investigation clearly indicates that the opposed symmetrising and asymmetrising forces in the Estado de las 
Autonomías were working against each other without reaching the fundamental compromise-solutions that 
would have been necessary to secure the survival of the system. Since the very beginning, the functioning 
of the decentralised Estado de las Autonomías thus seems to have been guided by the pacts and deals 
between the principal political parties or their absence rather than by any power or intelligence of the 
institutional setup itself. Even if it for a long time seemed that the institutional setup had helped solve or at 
least channel the territorial tensions within the Spanish state, it is highly questionable whether that is really 
the case. Conflict was lurking below the surface of even the very first Statutes of Autonomy to be passed, 
and three decades of functioning and deal-making did not make the conflicts go away or even diminish the 
tensions between the fundamental differences. 
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 See the intervention by the leader of the AP, Manuel Fraga, in DdSC, 29 November 1979, pp. 3184-3185, and the 
interventions by the senators Bosque and Matutes, in DdSS, 12 December 1979, pp. 1428-1431. 
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